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The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, it intends to provide theoretical elements to 
analyze  the  relation  between  real  exchange  rates  and  economic  development.  Our  main 
hypothesis is very much in line with the Dutch disease literature, and states that competitive 
currencies contribute to the existence and maintenance of the manufacturing sector in the 
economy.  This, in turn, brings about higher growth rates in the long run, given the existence 
of increasing returns in the industrial sector, and its importance in generating technological 
change and increasing productivity in the overall economy. The second objective of this paper 
is empirical. It intends to analyze examples of successful exchange rate policies, such as Chile 
and Indonesia in the eighties, as a benchmark for comparison with countries where currency 
overvaluation has taken place, such as Brazil. In the latter case, the local currency is being 
inflated by large capital inflows, due to high domestic interest rates and to a boom in demand 
and prices of commodities in the international markets. It will be argued that the industrial 
sector bears most of the burden when the currency appreciates, and that Brazil risks at de-
industrialization if there are no changes in the exchange rate regime. 
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Introduction   
There is now large empirical evidence and a relatively robust econometric literature on the 
relation  between  currency  over(under)valuation  and  long  term  per  capita  growth  rates. 
Competitive  exchange  rates  have  been  associated  with  most  East  and  Southeast  Asian 
successful  growth  strategies  in  the  last  30  years.  Growth  periods  in  Chile,  Uganda  and 
Mauritius in the 1980s and China in the 1990s are also related to undervalued currencies. 
While the empirical literature on this issue is relatively rich, theoretical analysis of channels 
through which real exchange rate levels could affect economic growth and development are 
very scarce, and mostly related to the so-called Dutch Disease.  
The idea of a Dutch disease refers to problems observed in the Netherlands in the end of the 
sixties and beginning of the seventies when new gas reserves were found. The rapid increase 
of  gas  exports  had  severe  consequences  in  the  Dutch  economy.  The  appreciation  of  the 
currency resulting from the new gas revenues caused severe problems to the manufacturing 
sector,  increasing  unemployment  and  reducing  growth.  The  new  gas  reserves  were, 
paradoxically, bad news for the Dutch economy. Several other cases of “resource curse” were 
analyzed in the literature. Australia in the 19
th century and Spain in 17
th century are good 
examples of manufacturing involution because of gold findings or flows. In general terms, the 
syndrome of a Dutch disease is related to the problems brought about by flows of income 
from natural resources such as gold, diamonds, oil and gas. 
By making production and exports of manufactures to world markets profitable, a competitive 
exchange rate would stimulate economic development, avoiding the problems of the so-called 
Dutch Disease. Resource rich countries would have difficulties in building a non-traditional 
export sector because of recurrent appreciation cycles originating from commodities exports. 
By  avoiding  excessive  appreciations,  monetary  authorities  would  contribute  to  the 
development  of  an  advanced  manufacturing  industry  which  would  provide  positive 
externalities for the rest of the economy. 
In our view, one of the main threats to development in resource rich countries today, such as 
Brazil and South Africa, is Dutch Disease. China, on the other hand,  offers  a very  good 
example of development led by exports and manufacturing production for world markets. In 
Brazil, exchange rate appreciation is starting to dismantle the production of manufactures, 
threatening,  thus,  the  recent  boom  in  exports  in  the  last  5  years.  The  recent  Brazilian   3 
appreciation is certainly related to the boom in metal prices, especially iron. According to the 
development approach to exchange rates, Brazil seems to be following a problematic path 
regarding exchange rate policy. China, on the other hand, is the perfect example of why a 
competitive and stable real exchange rate may promote growth. 
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, it intends to provide theoretical elements to 
analyze  the  relation  between  real  exchange  rates  and  economic  development.  Our  main 
hypothesis is very much in line with the Dutch disease literature, and states that competitive 
currencies contribute to the existence and maintenance of the manufacturing sector in the 
economy.  This, in turn, brings about higher growth rates in the long run, given the existence 
of increasing returns in the industrial sector, and its importance in generating technological 
change and increasing productivity in the overall economy. Alternatively, one can say that 
currency overvaluations may be one of the causes of de-industrialization, given the loss of 
competitiveness of domestic industries in the tradable sector. 
More specifically, this paper will use a Keynesian-Kaldorian perspective to explore two main 
theoretical channels through which exchange rates may impact per capita growth rates. The 
first channel, based on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), relates to the effects of the exchange rate 
on real wages and profit margins. By defining an aggregate investment function that depends 
on capacity utilization and on profit margins and a consumption function that depends on real 
wages, it is possible to set up a macro model where savings and investment levels are a 
function of real exchange rate levels. In this case, exchange rate policies may influence the 
pace of capital accumulation and, therefore, affect long-run growth. 
The second theoretical channel relates to the Kaldorian idea that the industrial sector is the 
engine of growth. The existence of increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing industry is 
expressed by increases in productivity in response to increases in total output. The existence 
(and level) of increasing returns in the manufacturing industry, in conjunction with the ability 
to attain higher rates of export growth determine if a country can engage in a virtuous cycle of 
growth or if this same country will be locked in a path of low growth rates. In addition, we 
will also explore the connection of export competitiveness and growth, as discussed in models 
of cumulative causation (e.g. Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975). 
The second objective of this paper is empirical. It intends to analyze examples of successful 
exchange  rate  policies,  such  as  Chile  and  Indonesia  in  the  eighties,  as  a  benchmark  for   4 
comparison with countries where currency overvaluation has taken place, such as Brazil. In 
the  latter  case,  the  local  currency  is  being  inflated  by  large  capital  inflows,  due  to  high 
domestic  interest  rates  and  to  a  boom  in  demand  and  prices  of  commodities  in  the 
international markets. It will be argued that the industrial sector bears most of the burden 
when the currency appreciates, and that Brazil risks at de-industrialization if there are no 
changes in the exchange rate regime. 
Therefore,  the  main  policy  recommendation  derived  from  this  study  is  that  developing 
countries  may  achieve  higher  per  capita  growth  rates  and  find  a  stairway  to  economic 
development by expanding their industrial sector and avoiding de-industrialization, and that 
competitive currency policies may be an useful instrument towards that goal. 
 
Keynesian effects 
One of the most important real effects of exchange rate levels in long term growth is on 
aggregate investment. Based on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) we can show in formal terms 
how  a  competitive  currency  may  increase  investment,  savings  and  thus  stimulate  capital 
accumulation.  By  defining  an  aggregate  investment  function  that  depends  on  capacity 
utilization and on profit margins and a consumption function that depends on real wages, it is 
possible to set up a macro model where savings and investment levels are a function of real 
wages and, thus, real exchange rate levels. 
We start, following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), with a savings function  S  that depends on a 
fixed share  s of capitalists’ profits. Workers don’t save in so far as they consume all their 
income. 
* *) / )( / ( Y Y Y Y R s sR S = =              (1) 
where  R  is the capitalists’ income and  * Y  potential output. By defining  Y R h / =  as the 
capitalists’ share of total income,  * /Y Y z =  as capacity utilization and normalizing potential 
output   1 * = Y , we have: 
shz S =                          (2) 
0 1 > > h                        (2.1)   5 
0 1 > > z                        (2.2) 
By following a traditional mark-up pricing rule, we can define profit margins or mark-ups as 
follows:  
1 ) / ( − = bw p m                     (3) 
where  p  is the price level, w the nominal wage,  b / 1  the productivity level and m  a mark-up 
over labor costs. By defining  Y W /  as the labor share in income,  N as the level of employed 
workers and  Y N b / = ,  we have the labor share in income as a function of the mark-up level, 
m p bw pY wN Y W + = = = 1 / 1 / / /             (4) 
and the capitalists’ share in income  Y R h / =  will be, 
m m Y W pY wN pY Y R h + = − = − = = 1 / / 1 / ) ( /         (5) 
Equations (3), (4) and (5) give us the traditional distributive relations. For given productivity 
levels, there is an inverse relationship between mark-ups and real wages. The higher the mark 
ups, the lower the real wages and the higher the share of profits in income h. 
It is important to introduce at this point a crucial, but fairly ignored, issue: the role of real 
exchange rate levels on the determination of real wages and profitability in the short run and, 
thus, in the distributive relations. As discussed in the previous section, the more overvalued 
the domestic currency is, the higher real wages will be in so far as the prices of tradable 
consumption goods, especially commodities, will decrease alongside with the appreciation. If 
we assume that workers receive a nominal wage  w and consume tradable and non tradable 
goods, their cost of living will depend on the nominal exchange rate level and on the share of 
tradable goods in their consumption basket. According to this kind of reasoning, real wages 
and profits will, thus, depend on the level of the real exchange rate, besides the patterns of 
income distribution and productivity levels. 
If we assume that the price level can be defined as an average of tradable  pt and non tradable 
pnt prices, 
pnt pt p ) 1 ( α α − + =                 (6)   6 
and, further assuming that tradable prices in domestic terms are exogenously determined by 
the nominal exchange rate level e and international prices  * p ,  
e p pt * =                     (7) 
we can see how profitability and the real wage will depend on the real exchange rate level 
(defined as the ratio of tradable to non tradable prices) using again the mark-up pricing rule 
(3), 
1 } / } ) 1 ( ) * {{( − − + = bw pnt e p m α α                (8) 
A devaluation of the exchange rate, causing increases in tradable prices as compared to the 
nominal wage, means a reduction in real wages and an increase in profits as long as eventual 
increases in  w due to the devaluation are lower than the increases in the nominal exchange 
rate,  for  given  international  price  levels.  This  usually  happens  if  nominal  wages  remain 
constant or move slower than prices of goods. We are, thus, assuming here the hypothesis of 
nominal wage rigidity and real wage flexibility as opposed to nominal flexibility and real 
rigidity.  
By  assuming  that  workers  don’t  save,  as  Bhaduri  and  Marglin  (1990)  do,  we  can  then 
conclude that higher real wages and appreciated currencies are associated with lower saving 
rates and higher consumption levels. As a consequence, aggregate demand can increase or 
decrease because of higher real wages, depending on the effects of lower profit margins on 
aggregate investment. If, following Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), we define an investment 
function that depends only on profit margins: 
) (h I I =                                     (9) 
0 / > ∂ ∂ h I                                  (9.1) 
Equilibrium in the goods market is achieved by the traditional savings = investment identity, 
in other terms an IS curve: 
) (h I shz =                                   (10) 
Capacity utilization levels will vary as a function of profit margins according to the following 
derivative:    7 
sh sz I h z h / ) ( / − = ∂ ∂                   (11) 
0 / > ∂ ∂ = h I Ih                             (11.1) 
As  sh  is  always  positive,  capacity  utilization  will  increase  or  decrease  depending  on 
) ( sz Ih − .  If  investment  is  inelastic  to  changes  in  profit  margins,  real  wage  falls  will  be 
recessionary  because  decreases  in  consumption  will  not  be  compensated  for  increases  in 
investment  ) ( sz Ih < . This is the classical under-consumptionist thesis, where low real wages 
lead to low consumption and aggregate demand. On the other hand, real wage increases will 
be expansionary compensating for low investment levels. This kind of “consumption-led” 
growth,  can,  nevertheless,  be  problematic  in  the  long  run  because  of  installed  capacity 
constraints. If investment is elastic to profit margins, we have the opposite effect. Lower real 
wages will increase profit margins and investment, stimulating aggregate demand, capacity 
utilization and savings. Growth will then be “investment-led”.  
Building up on this simple model, Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) introduce capacity utilization 
as a direct determinant of investment levels. Responses of aggregate investment depend now 
on capacity utilization  z  and on profit margins and profit shares in income h, which leads to 
a new goods market equilibrium: 
  0 , 0 ), , ( > > = z h I I z h I I                   (12) 
) , ( z h I shz =                                       (13) 
) /( ) ( / z h I sh sz I h z − − = ∂ ∂                (14) 
By imposing the Keynesian condition that equilibrium in goods market is achieved through 
changes in savings rather than investment  0 ) ( > − z I sh , they arrive at the same qualitative 
conclusions of the simple case where investment depends only on profit margins and profit 
shares in income h. In a final step Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) extend the model to the open 
economy case with real exports  e X  and imports  m X  that depend respectively on the real 
exchange rate θ  and on capacity utilization  z , with the following elasticities: 
e e e X d dX η θ θ = ) / )( / (                    (15)   8 
m m m X d dX η θ θ − = ) / )( / (                (16) 
u X z z X m m = ∂ ∂ ) / )( / (                      (17) 
In the new goods market equilibrium total savings plus imports in nominal terms  M  equals 
total investment plus exports in nominal terms E  
E z h I M shz + = + ) , (                       (18) 
The partial derivative of capacity utilization  z  with respect to profit margins and profit share 
h is very similar to the closed economy case (11): 
) )( ( / z h I sh gu sz I h z − + − = ∂ ∂              (19) 
where  g  represents the initial share of imports and exports over GDP and u  is the elasticity 
of imports with respect to capacity utilization. By assuming that  0 ) ( > − + z I sh gu , we arrive 
again at the same conclusions of the simple case. 
In the open economy case, a real devaluation decreases the real wage and increases profit 
margins, for given productivity levels. Income, exports and investment will increase as long 
as those two macro functions are sufficiently elastic. In the case of exports and imports, the 
overall effect on external accounts will be positive if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, an 
assumption used throughout the paper  ) 1 ( > + m e η η .  
To sum up, this simple model presents possible responses of a system to exogenous variations 
in real wages and exchange rates from a broad Keynesian perspective. The real exchange rate 
plays an important role in the capital accumulation process by defining real wages and profits. 
The model applies mainly to the short run, when productivity is held constant. For given 
productivity levels, a competitive currency tends to stimulate investment and exports. When 
productivity increases in the long run, there is pressure for the real exchange rate to appreciate 
because wages and prices of non tradables go up. So if the strategy works, there is always the 
tendency  of  the  exchange  rate  to  appreciate  as  a  consequence  of  increases  in  per  capita 
income (Balassa-Samuelson effect). The next section discusses in greater detail the idea that 
productivity  increases  may  be  a  consequence  of  successful  exchange  rate  policies,  with 
positive impacts on long-run growth rates.   9 
Kaldorian effects 
The second channel describing the influence of exchange rate on growth comes from models 
of circular and cumulative causation in the Kaldorian tradition. The basic argument is that an 
initial growth in output induces productivity gains that allow for reduction of unit labor costs 
and,  given  a  mark-up  pricing  rule,  for  fall  in  prices,  increasing  the  competitiveness  of  a 
country or region. These gains, in turn, allow for further output expansion through increasing 
exports, which reinitiate the cycle. In conclusion, once a country or region acquires a growth 
advantage, it will tend to keep it through the process of increasing returns and consequent 
competitive gains that growth itself induces. 
Kaldor (1970) developed the broad ideas and mechanisms behind the cumulative causation 
model in an intuitive and verbal way. A few years later, Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) provided 
the first formalization of the standard cumulative causation model. The basic model is well-
known, and can be summarized in equations (20) to (23) below. First, the rate of growth of 
output is a function of the growth of exports (autonomous component of demand): 
t t x y . γ =                 (20) 
where yt refers to the rate of growth of output; xt is the rate of growth of exports and γ is the 
elasticity of output growth with respect to export growth. 
The growth rate of exports, in turn, can be expressed as: 
t t t t z pf pd x ε η + − = ) .(             (21) 
where  pdt,  pft  are  the  growth  rates  of  domestic  and  foreign  prices,  respectively;  zt  is  the 
growth rate of world income; η (< 0) is the price elasticity of demand for exports and ε is the 
income elasticity of demand for exports. 
The rate of growth of domestic prices is given by a mark-up pricing equation: 
t t t t r w pd τ + − =               (22) 
where wt, rt and τt  represent the rates of change of money wages, of the average product of 
labor and of the mark-up on unit labor costs, respectively.   10 
Finally, “the linchpin of the system” (Dixon and Thirlwall, 1975, p. 205) is given by the 
Verdoorn equation, specified as: 
t a t y r r . λ + =                 (23) 
where ra is the rate of autonomous productivity growth and λ the Verdoorn coefficient. This 
equation provides the basic mechanism for cumulative causation in the model. The growth of 
output raises labor productivity, and promotes a reduction of domestic prices (equation 22), 
leading to higher export growth (equation 21) and further output growth (equation 20). 
Combining equations (20), (21), (22) and (23), the expression of the equilibrium growth rate 
of output can be obtained: 
λ η γ
ε τ η γ
. . 1
] ) ( .[
+
+ − + −
=
t t t a t
t
z pf r w
y
          (24) 
Equation  (24)  shows  that  output  growth  depends  positively  on  the  growth  rates  of 
productivity (ra), foreign prices (pft)
4, and the world income (zt), and on the income elasticity 
for exports (ε). Also, output growth is a negative function of the rates of growth of money 
wages and mark-ups. 
Based on this model and subsequent developments in the literature, two arguments can be put 
forward relating exchange rate policies and growth. The first and more immediate one is that 
competitive real exchange rates may provide a “start up” shock on exports which may initiate 
a virtuous growth cycle along the lines described in the model. As Frenkel and Taylor (2006, 
p.5) put it: “If export demand and production of import substitutes are stimulated immediately 
or over time by a sustained weak RER, aggregate demand should rise and drive up economic 
activity and employment in the medium to long run.” 
The second argument refers to the effects of exchange rate levels on the economy’s pattern of 
specialization,  and  the  related  Kaldorian  statement  that  “manufacturing  is  the  engine  of 
growth” – also known as Kaldor’s First Growth Law (Kaldor, 1966). The starting point here 
is the recognition that actual experiences of long-run growth and development are associated 
with structural changes in the economy, generally leading to the decline of low-productivity 
                                                 
4 Since η < 0.   11 
traditional sectors and the rise of high-productivity modern sectors. In particular, it is argued 
that  the  size  and  dynamism  of  the  manufacturing  sector  represent  a  central  element  in 
successful development strategies. In other words, it implies that high growth rates are usually 
found in cases where the share of manufacturing industry in GDP is increasing. 
The  explanation  for  the  correlation  between  the  growth  of  manufacturing  output  and  the 
overall performance of the economy is to be found on the impact of the former on the growth 
of productivity in the economy. There are two possible reasons for such effect. The first 
relates to the fact that the expansion of manufacturing output and employment leads to the 
transfer  of  labor  from  low  productivity  sectors  (or  disguised  unemployment)  to  industrial 
activities  (that  present  higher  productivity  levels).  The  outcome  is  an  increasing  overall 
productivity in the economy and little or no negative impact on the output of the traditional 
sectors,  given  the  existence  of  surplus  labor.  According  to  Kaldor,  this  process  is 
characteristic  of  the  transition  from  “immaturity”  to  “maturity”,  where  an  “immature” 
economy  is  defined  as  one  in  which  there  is  a  large  amount  of  labor  available  in  low 
productivity sectors that can be transferred to industry. 
The second reason for the relation between manufacturing growth and productivity relates to 
the existence of static and dynamic increasing returns in the industrial sector. Static returns 
relate mainly to economies of scale internal to the firm, whereas dynamic returns refer to 
increasing  productivity  derived  from  learning  by  doing,  ‘induced’  technological  change, 
external economies in production, et cetera. 
The  role  of  exchange  rate  policies  can  be  analyzed  from  this  perspective.    Excessively 
appreciated  currencies  affect  mostly  the  profitability  of  investments  in  the  manufacturing 
(tradable)  sector  where  increasing  returns  are  ubiquitous.  By  relocating  resources  to  non-
manufacturing sectors, especially non-tradable activities and commodity production, where 
decreasing returns rule, overvaluations affect negatively the overall productivity dynamics of 
the economy. Undervaluations, on the other hand, tend to boost profitability and investment in 
increasing  returns  sectors.  With  sufficiently  elastic  investment  and  export  responses,  the 
economy would get into an investment-led pattern of growth and structural change. 
From  a  Kaldorian  perspective,  the  real  exchange  rate  level  is,  therefore,  a  key  variable 
affecting development in an open economy environment. By defining the relative prices of 
tradables  to  non-tradables  and,  therefore,  the  level  of  profitability  in  most  manufacturing   12 
industries, the real exchange rate determines which sectors are viable or not. In a developing 
economy, intense overvaluations tend to shut down entire industries, blocking the channel of 
productivity increases in the overall economy through the relocation of abundant labor from 
low-earning  and  low-productivity  jobs  to  high-earning  and  high-productivity  jobs  in 
manufacturing.  In  other  words,  overvaluations  may  prevent  developing  economies  from 
reaching a “mature” state where surplus labor has been exhausted. Relative undervaluations 
may,  on  the  other  hand,  contribute  to  productivity  increases  by  integrating  workers  in 
increasing returns sectors, avoiding the problems raised by the Dutch disease literature. 
There is an additional way of looking at the relation between pattern of specialization and 
growth, and the effects of exchange rate policies. A basic proposition from the well-known 
Balance-of-Payments  constrained  growth  model  developed  by  Thirlwall  (1979)  is  that 
economic  growth  in  the  long  run  is  bound  by  the  country’s  ability  to  keep  its  external 
balance
5. Under restrictive assumptions, it is shown that an economy’s growth rate in the long 
run is given by the ratio between export growth (x) and the income elasticity of imports (π) – 
the so-called Thirlwall’s Law: 
π
x
yBP =                 (25) 
In this case, it can be argued that the income elasticity of imports is not independent from the 
patterns of specialization of the economy, in the sense that different sectors show different 
responses in terms of imports when the economy is growing. This idea is put forward in a 
formal model by Araujo and Lima (2007). They develop a multi-sectoral model based on 
Pasinetti’s  structural  dynamics  approach  (Pasinetti,  1981,  1993)  in  which  the  aggregate 
income elasticities of imports and exports depend on the sectoral elasticities as well as on the 
share  of  each  sector  in  the  total  of  imports  and  exports.  Taking  this  result  along  with 
Thirlwall’s Law, it is straightforward to conclude that the economy’s pattern of specialization 
affects its balance-of-payments constrained growth rates. 
If we follow the view from classical development economists according to whom primary 
products show low income elasticities and manufactures present high income elasticities, it 
becomes clear that promoting a pattern of specialization based on manufacturing exports may  
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benefit growth, and that processes of de-industrialization may harm economic growth in the 
long run. 
The implications in terms of exchange rate policies reinforce the arguments put forward in 
this paper. I.e., by stimulating non-traditional industries, a competitive exchange rate may be 
able to change the share of each sector in aggregate exports or imports, and therefore cause a 
decline in the overall income elasticity of demand for imports, with positive effects on long 
run growth. On the other hand, “a prolonged period of exchange-rate appreciation can be 
detrimental  for  growth  in  the  long  run,  because  it may  induce  a  change  in  the  structural 
determinants of the BoP constraint” (Barbosa-Filho, 2006, p.3) 
An adequate exchange rate policy can, thus, help stimulate the non traditional tradable sector 
of developing economies, particularly the ones related to export manufactures. As Williamson 
(2003) argues in his “development approach” to exchange rates, a competitive currency would 
provide  stimulus  for  the  development  of  a  non  commodity  dependent  tradable  sector, 
therefore avoiding Dutch disease problems and premature deindustrialization (Palma, 2003b). 
By stimulating the production of industrial manufactures to the world markets, a competitive 
exchange rate would help developing countries to climb up the technological ladder. Learning 
by doing and cumulative technological progress would depend heavily on the development of 
the  manufacturing  sector  (Williamson,  2003;  Palma,  2003b).  The  argument  is  especially 
relevant  for  resource-rich  countries.  Appreciated  currency  levels  originating  from  high 
commodity exports would prevent the development of an industrial sector with its related 
economies of scale and technological spill-overs. In this sense, by avoiding overvaluations, 
exchange rate policy could work as an effective industrial policy tool. 
To sum up, following all these approaches, competitive exchange rates would contribute to 
capital  accumulation  by  stimulating  investment.  On  technological  grounds,  it  would 
encourage the development of the non traditional tradable sector, helping countries go through 
structural  change  and  climb  up  the  technological  ladder.  By  increasing  productivity,  the 
development of a dynamic non traditional tradable sector  could also increase  real wages, 
counteracting the negative effects of a weak currency for workers. 
In the next two sections, we describe the successful experiences of Indonesia and Chile in 
order to illustrate how competitive exchange rates may play a role in long-run growth and 
development.   14 
The case of Indonesia 
In spite of large oil reserves, rubber and lumber, Indonesia was amongst the poorest and most 
populous nations of the world in the 1970s. Its real GDP per capita in that time was around 
US$715 (at 1985 US dollars) and its population was 129 million. The technocrats that came to 
power with General Suharto after the 1967 coup launched a very successful economic plan 
within  the  following  lines:  stabilization,  investments  in  agriculture,  industry  and  infra-
structure,  trade  and  exports  promotion,  fiscal  austerity  and  financial  reform.  The  foreign 
exchange market was unified, the rupiah devalued and a fixed exchange rate regime adopted 
after  1971.  In  the  beginning  of  the  seventies  some  good  results  could  already  be  seen: 
inflation came under 10% per year, agriculture and industry prospered and foreign reserves 
increased. Tax proceedings increased from 4% of GDP in 1965 to 10% in 1970.  
In the mid 1970s, the fixed exchange rate regime – along with an increase in inflation caused 
by  negative  supply  shocks  and  by  increase  in  domestic  demand  –  led  to  a  significant 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. According to Gelb (1988, p. 207), the real exchange 
rate  index  moved  from  100  in  1970-1972  to  133  in  1978.  Government  responded  with 
tightening of fiscal and monetary policies. Also in 1978, the rupiah was devalued, from 415 to 
625 per dollar. Many analysts
6 stress that the devaluation was not associated with balance of 
payments problems, since foreign resources kept flowing in the country due to oil exports. 
Gelb (1988) argues that the main goal of the authorities was to protect the (non-oil) tradable 
goods sectors, especially rubber, coffee and the incipient manufacturing industry. In addition, 
the increases in public revenues given by the raise in oil prices in 1973-4 were largely used in 
infrastructure expenditures in agriculture and manufacturing. 
After the second oil shock, the reaction of the authorities was also very positive. The country 
was able to keep its fiscal balance and in some cases to obtain surpluses. In terms of balance 
of payments, Indonesia moved from a current account deficit of 1.6% of GDP (excluding 
mining  activities)  to  a  surplus  of  2.3%  of  GDP  in  the  late  1970s.  The  foreign  reserves 
increased from US$ 2.6 billion in 1978 to US$ 5 billion in 1980, despite the high external 
debt the country had. Between 1978 and 1982, the real exchange rate was roughly stable 
(Gelb,  1988).  After  the  decrease  in  oil  prices  in  the  early  1980s  and  the  consequent 
deterioration  of  the  current  account  results,  the  government  promoted  an  additional 
devaluation of the rupiah – to 970 per dollar in 1983. 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, World Bank (1993, p. 127) and Hill (2000, p. 16).   15 
During the 1980s, exchange rate policies included another devaluation in 1986 as a response 
to a new decline in oil prices, and the subsequent adoption of a crawling peg regime until 
early  1990s.  At  first  the  rupiah  followed  the  dollar,  which  depreciated  after  the  Plaza 
agreements, especially in comparison with the Yen. After the stabilization of the dollar and 
some appreciation in the early 1990s, the authorities in Indonesia followed a broader crawling 
peg, promoting the devaluation of the rupiah in relation to a basket of currencies. Graphs 1 
and 2 below show the behavior of the foreign accounts and of the real exchange rate of the 
rupiah to the US dollar in the last decades. Values above zero mean overvaluations and below 








































      *Source: World Bank. 
Graph 3 below shows the evolution of real exchange rates for oil rich countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Indonesia shows considerable depreciation after 1978, especially when compared 










*Source: Author’s calculation using data from Easterly (2001). 
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Collier et al (1999) highlight the superiority of exchange rate management in Indonesia when 
compared to Nigeria during the 1970s and 1980s, “the difference in visions was reflected in 
different  exchange  rate  strategies.  By  the  late  1970s  Indonesian  policymakers  chose  to 
sacrifice  part  of  the  public  investment  program  to  achieve  exchange  rate  undervaluation, 
thereby protecting competitiveness. Because Indonesian nontraditional exports grew rapidly 
in response, the policies were vindicated by success and became more secure. By contrast, not 
only did the Nigerian government allow the exchange rate to appreciate during the oil boom, 
with  dramatic  consequences  for  non-oil  exports,  but  also,  as  the  boom  receded,  the 
government chose to maintain the exchange rate at its now overvalued level. A task force on 
inflation,  which  reported  in  1982,  recommended  this  as  an  appropriate  counterinflation 
policy”
7. 
The most successful performance in the Indonesian economy was in non-oil exports. From 
1982  to  1992,  the  exports  of  non-oil  products  increased  300%.  In  1979,  after  the  first 
devaluation took place, manufacturing exports increased 260%. Similar behavior was seen 
after the 1983 devaluation (Gelb, 1988, p. 220). The sharp increase in manufacturing exports 
was one of the main responsible for keeping up the Indonesian economy after the decline in 
oil prices in the mid-eighties. In this case, foreign direct investment in export-led sectors had 
also an important role after 1986. In terms of export composition, there was a significant 
change during the decade. In 1980, 3% of Indonesian exports were manufactured goods. In 
1983, this percentage is 7% and in 1992 it reaches 50%. However, despite the importance of 
exports in the structural transformation of the economy, the country did not follow a typical 
export-led growth path, as did its neighboring countries in Asia. Until the early 1990s, exports 
never grew above 31% of GDP. 
Table 1 shows the composition of Indonesian exports over time. The five categories below 
represent the degree of technological complexity of export goods. The data shows a clear 
increase in exports of low, medium and high technology goods from the 1980s on, and a 




                                                 
7 Collier et al 1999, pg.4.   18 
Table 1 
Composition of Exports – Indonesia, 1960s-1990s  
Product Category  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
Primary products  70,6%  49,0%  47,5%  18,1% 
Natural resource-based manufactures  24,3%  48,5%  37,2%  31,2% 
Low technology  3,1%  1,0%  9,3%  30,2% 
Medium technology  1,1%  0,7%  4,0%  13,0% 
High technology  0,6%  0,8%  2,0%  7,40% 
Total  100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  100,0% 
*Authors’ calculation based on Lall (2001), Ocampo and Parra (2005), and UNCTAD, Handbook of 
international statistics online. 
 
 
Gelb (1988) concludes that Indonesia represents one of the most successful responses to the 
oil  shocks.  The  country  was  able  to  strengthen  the  agricultural  sector  and  to  develop  a 
manufacturing  exports  base  despite  the  large  revenue  inflows  from  oil  exports.  In  fact, 
Indonesia underwent a significant structural transformation during the period 1970-1990. In 
the mid sixties, agriculture represented 53% of GDP, moving to 19% in the early nineties. The 
share of employment in agriculture fell from 73% in 1961 to 50% in 1990. Therefore, we can 
say  that  Indonesia  was  able  to  avoid  the  “Dutch  Disease”  by  taking  several  preventive 
measures, including adequate exchange rate policies. 
The real devaluations in the late 1970s and 1980s seem to have strongly influenced the good 
performance  of  the  economy.  Azis  (1990)  stresses  the  positive  role  of  the  exchange  rate 
policy  during  the  period,  especially  regarding  the  stimulus  for  the  manufacturing  exports 
sector: “A series of adjustment programs were undertaken with fair success despite some 
social costs involved. Two major devaluations were implemented, one in March 1983 (28%) 
and  the  other  in  September  1986  (31%)  followed  by  more  active  adoption  of  managed 
floating system resulting in a 55% depreciation in the real effective exchange rate during 
1981-1988. The results have been very encouraging from the viewpoint of boosting the non-
oil exports. In fact, it is believed that the impacts of devaluation were greater than those of the 
trade deregulation, at least as for the last two years” (Azis, 1990, p. 242). 
The good macroeconomic performance of Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s are obviously not 
to be explained only by the virtues of the exchange rate policy. A broader analysis of the 
macroeconomic and industrial policies during the period is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the importance of the exchange rate  policy as a central piece in the successful 
development  strategy  of  Indonesia  seems  to  emerge  from  the  evidence  described  above. 
Given the abundance of natural resources in the country, a laissez-faire-type management of   19 
the  macroeconomic  policy  would  most  likely  lead  to  greater  dependency  of  international 
commodity markets – with the well-known risks and problems pointed out by the economic 
development literature. The advance of a non-traditional tradables sector and its integration to 
the world market seems to be an essential prerequisite in the successful trajectory of Indonesia 
until the late 1990s. 
The experience of Indonesia is in line with the empirical literature that stresses the importance 
of  competitive  exchange  rates  as  an  explanation  for  the  relative  success  of  South  Asian 
countries in the last 30 years, especially when compared to the disappointing performance of 
developing countries in Africa and Latin America (Bresser-Pereira, 2006; Cottani et al, 1990; 
Dollar, 1992; Benaroya and Janci, 1999; Fajnzylber et al, 2002). For that reason, Indonesia 
represents  an  interesting  case-study  for  this  topic,  which  has  central  importance  in  the 
developing world today. 
 
The case of Chile 
After the military coup that brought to power the Pinochet government, a strong orthodox and 
recessionary  policy  was  adopted  to  control  Chilean  internal  and  external  disequilibria
8. 
Government spending is severely cut, the currency is devalued and a liberal agenda of trade 
and financial opening is adopted. The fiscal deficit is reduced from 25% of GDP in 1973 to 
2.5%  in  1975  and  GDP  falls  by  more  then  15%  in  1975.  Falling  imports  and  increasing 
exports help to put the current account on positive grounds in 1976. Growth picks up in the 
following years but inflation remains worryingly high, leading the government to adopt an 
exchange rate based stabilization policy, the so called tablitas. As in the 1971-1973 period, 
there is strong currency overvaluation which eventually leads to a major financial crises in 
1982. Chile experiences two major currency crises in less than 10 years.  
Current  account  deficits  in  the  beginning  of  the1980s  were  in  the  range  of  7%  of  GDP, 
peaking at 14,5% in 1981 (Graph 4). Capital flow reversals due to the monetary shock in the 
US and the Mexican default finally lead the fixed exchange rate regime to a collapse in Chile. 
A  major  devaluation  of  currency  takes  place  again.  The  failure  of  the  stabilization  plan 
resulted in severe crises. GDP fell around 15% in 1982 and a banking crises hit the Chilean 
financial sector, which was eventually rescued by the Central Bank.   
                                                 
8 Ffrench-Davis (2002, p. 24).   20 
Since then economists and monetary authorities in Chile started to deal with exchange rate 
issues more carefully. Chief among the worries were the overvaluation of the currency and 
current account deficits. The failure of the regime adopted from 1979 up until 1982 is usually 
refereed to as something not to be repeated. “Después de una experiencia fallida de tipo de 
cambio fijo en 1982, que derivó en una devaluación y una recesión, se instauró un sistema de 
tipo de cambio reptante. Este tenía como objetivo implícito el promover un tipo de cambio 
real depreciado que estimulara las exportaciones y ayudara en la recuperación generando los 
recursos necesarios para pagar la enorme deuda externa”
9. Or in terms of current account 
deficits and policy mandates, “la ley impone como objetivo el logro del equilibrio externo, lo 
que se interpretó como una afirmación de que el déficit  en la cuenta corriente de la balanza 
de pagos importa, y de que es necesario asegurar que dicho déficit esté dentro de un rango 
preestablecido”
10.  
Graph 4  






















































Obs.: (-) déficit. World Development Indicators, 2003. 
 
As a reaction to the problems of the beginning of the 1980s, the second part of the Pinochet 
government  that  goes  from  1982  to  1990  is  much  more  pragmatic  in  terms  of  policy 
orientation. The Central Bank adopts a policy of mini-devaluations and crawling peg with the 
objective of maintaining real competitiveness. In august 1984 a formal band that would last 
up until 1999
11 is introduced. Several devaluations in the center of the band (taxa acuerdo) 
                                                 
9 De Gregório et al (2005, p. 2) 
10 Zahler (1998, p. 51) 
11 For a detailed discussion seeWilliamson (1996).   21 
during the 1980s contributed to e real devaluation of the Chilean currency of approximately 
130% between 1982 and 1988. There is some appreciation in the end of the 1980s because of 
increases in copper price, but the widening of external deficits in 1989 and 1990 due to high 
growth end up devaluing the currency again to the bottom of the band
12. 
During the 1990s the regime was adapted to the new global liquidity environment and capital 
flows  abundance  to  emerging  economies.  The  new  democratic  government  increased  the 
focus on inflation control, but the external sector was consolidating itself as the country’s 
growth engine. Capital inflows put appreciation pressure in the currency and the band was 
very important to avoid strong appreciation cycles. Current account deficits were monitored 
and the targets were set to 3%-4% of GDP. Average deficits for the period 1990/1995 was -
2,5 % do PIB and for the 1996/1998 period -5,2% (Graph 4).  
The new democratic government and the return of Chile to international financial markets 
attracted large capital inflows. Besides strong interventions and accumulation of reserves, the 
Central Bank adopted capital controls in 1991 in the form of non remunerated deposits. Its 
main objective was to avoid severe short term capital inflows and to maintain the parity of the 
peso. Eventually the rate was increased from 20% to 30% in 1993 and only reduced to 10% 
and then finally abolished in the Asian financial crises in 1998. Capital outflows were also 
liberalized in the beginning of the 1990s with the aim of maintain competitiveness. Exports 
proceedings, for example, were allowed to stay outside the country. As graph 5 shows below, 
despite all those measures, some appreciation was observed in Chile, and the exchange rate 







                                                 
12 Ffrench-Davis 2002, p.148.    22 
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The  central  bank  adjusted  the  center  of  the  band  with  discrete  valuations.  In  1994  the 
reference currency basket for the band was changed, and the dollar lost space (from 50% to 
45%). Other reference currencies were the Deutsch Mark and the Japanese Yen. All those 
measures  tried  to  introduce  some  uncertainty  in  exchange  rate  management  as  a  form  of 
avoiding arbitrages and also as way of maintaining real competitiveness.     
All those measures were not able to avoid some appreciation of the currency in the beginning 
of the 1990s as shown in graph 6. The Central Bank used this in part to help controlling 
inflation.  Some  appreciation  maybe  also  be  credited  to  increases  in  productivity  and  a 
considerable upgrading of the economy since the crises in the beginning of the 1980s. But 
still, when we compare appreciations in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina in the same period, the 
appreciation of the Chilean peso  was not significant. According to Ffrench-Davis’ (2004, 
p.209) calculations, in 1994 the Chilean peso was 3,6% stronger than in 1987-1990 whereas 
this  number  for  the  rest  of  Latin  America  was  24%.  During  the  period  1995-1997  more 
appreciation is observed in Chile and this number goes up to 16%, when the Asian crises hits 
the economy devaluing the currency. 
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Graph 6 
 
    *Central  Bank of  Chile. 
 
Chile tried to maintain competitiveness and to avoid overvaluation that would cause trouble to 
exports. Up until the Asian crises, exports were growing above 10% per year. Graph 7 shows 
overvaluations  and  undervaluations  for  the  Chilean  real  exchange  rate  based  on  Easterly 
(2001) calculations for the 1970-1999. Values above zero mean overvaluations and below 
zero  undervaluations.  It’s  easy  to  see  from  the  graph  below  that  after  the  crises  in  the 

















































  *Source: Author’s calculation using data from Easterly (2001). 
 
  
Several authors have identified this kind of policy stance in Chile during the 1980s and 1990s. 
As Morandé e Tapia (2002) put it,  “the fact that the band’s center followed the difference 
between domestic and external inflation reveals that there was a concern with misalignments 
of the real exchange rate with respect to a PPP concept, as well as an attempt to manage - at 
least partially - the real exchange rate” (Morandé e Tapia 2002, p.1). According to Zahler 
(1998), there was a concern among policy makers that current accounts should be kept under 
control and that development should be mainly financed with internal savings
13.  
When analyzing the last three decades of economic policy in Chile, Ffrench-Davis (2004) 
highlights the role of competitive exchange rates and its contrast with liberal reforms, “em 
suma, durante las três ultimas décadas Chile presenció um período de excepcional crecimiento 
de  sus  exportaciones.  Tan  notable  desempeño  estuvo  asociado,  durante  lãs  últimas  dos 
décadas, a políticas heterodoxas más bien activas que procuraron preservar um tipo de cambio 
real  competitivo  y  generar  capacidad  exportadora,  en  contraste  com  la  implantación, 
unicamente, de reformas económicas ortodoxas, como ocurrió em los setenta”
14. 
                                                 
13 Zahler (1998, p.54).  
14 Ffrench-Davis 2004, p.225. 
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Exports growth in the period 1960-1973 was 3,5%, keeping the pace in the 1973-1983 period 
and then jumping to 5,5% in 1983-2002
15. Table 2 below summarizes the composition of 
Chilean exports over time. The main point is the continuous decline in the exports of primary 
products, and a simultaneous increase in the exports of resource-based manufactures. 
Table 2 
Composition of Exports – Chile, 1960s-1990s  
Product Category  anos 60  anos 70  anos 80  Anos 90 
Primary products  73.2%  67.1%  65.0%  58.2% 
Natural resource-based manufactures  24.5%  29.5%  31.7%  33.4% 
Low technology  0.4%  1.0%  0.9%  3.1% 
Medium technology  1.6%  2.2%  2.1%  4.8% 
High technology  0.1%  0.1%  0.2%  0.5% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
*Authors’ calculation based on Lall (2001), Ocampo and Parra (2005), and UNCTAD, Handbook of 
international statistics online. 
 
 
Graph 8 below shows the evolution of real exchange rates for Brazil, Argentina, México, 
Colombia e Chile since 1979 based on Easterly’s (2001) data. There is a clear (and well 
known) pattern of real appreciation during the 1990s for Brazil, Argentina and México, not 






















 *Source: Author’s calculation using data from Easterly (2001). 
                                                 
15 Alvarez 2004, p.123 
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In a book on exchange rate regimes for developing countries, Williamson (1996) highlights 
the importance of exchange rate policy in the Chile as a way of avoiding Dutch disease, 
“Chile emerged from the 1982 crisis with a strong national consensus that Dutch disease is 
indeed dangerous. Although that consensus seems to be beginning to fray in the financial 
sector, it still dominates the thought of the policymaking community. The implication is that 
the Chilean authorities will not revise the target current account deficit upward, or at least not 
by enough to resolve the tension. The options that leave are to continue sterilizing a large part 
of the inflow, to reduce the incentive for the inflow by lowering the interest rates in Chile, to 
choke off more of the inflow through tighter capital controls, or to increase the outflow”
16.  
Several  economists  point  out  to  the  Chilean  experience  as  a  relative  success  in  terms  of 
exchange rate management during the 1980s and 1990s. Montiel (2003), Cardoso (2003) and 
Dornbusch et al (1995) see in the Chilean exchange rate policy on of the keys to understand 
its success. Chile was probably the only country in Latin America that changed to a free 
floating regime voluntarily in the end of the 1990s, not as a consequence of currency crises. 
Again,  the  successful  Chilean  growth  experience  on  those  years  cannot  be  reduced  to 
exchange rate management but it seems fair to say to it played a major role in that process, 
especially if we take in to account the relative copper abundance in the country. Again a 
laissez-faire-type management of the macroeconomic policy would probably lead to greater 
dependency  of  copper  prices  and  the  well-known  problems  pointed  out  by  the  economic 
development  literature.  Finally,  the  growing  non-traditional  tradables  sector  and  its 
integration to the world market seems to have played a role in Chilean successful trajectory as 
it did in Indonesia. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper provided theoretical elements to analyze the relation between real exchange rates 
and economic development. Our main hypothesis is that competitive currencies contribute to 
the existence and maintenance of a dynamic manufacturing sector in the economy.  This, in 
turn,  brings  about  higher  growth  rates  in  the  long  run,  given  the  existence  of  increasing 
returns in the industrial sector, and its importance in generating technological change and 
increasing productivity in the overall economy. 
                                                 
16 Williamson 1996, p.30.   27 
The empirical evidence analyzed here support our main hypothesis, and show a recurrent 
concern of the governments in Chile and Indonesia regarding the maintenance of competitive 
real exchange rates in the 1980s and 1990s. The high growth rates observed in these countries 
during  the  period  is  in  line  with  the  empirical  literature  that  stresses  the  importance  of 
competitive currencies for the overall performance of the economy. 
Therefore,  the  main  policy  recommendation  derived  from  this  study  is  that  developing 
countries  may  achieve  higher  per  capita  growth  rates  and  find  a  stairway  to  economic 
development by expanding their industrial sector and avoiding de-industrialization, and that 
competitive currency policies may be an useful instrument towards that goal. 
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